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Abstract
This study aims to investigate the characteristics of the efficient evolution of 
China’s iron and steel industry against the backdrop of limited openness and 
regulation and to discuss the important effects of regulatory policy and total factor 
productivity (TFP) of China’s iron and steel industry. The method adopted the 
Cobb–Douglas production function combined with a semi-parametric method to 
decompose productivity. This study based on the micro-level dataset of iron and 
steel enterprises in the database of China’s industrial enterprises between 1998 
and 2007 that investigated the intrinsic correlation among corporate entry and 
exit, market competition of existing enterprises, and TFP growth in the iron and 
steel industry. The results of the research show that the entry-exit would promote 
the growth of the aggregate productivity, while the low efficiency of resource 
allocation would significantly inhibit the TFP growth. The basic conclusion is that, 
with substantial government intervention in enterprise investments, market 
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competition may not promote optimal resource allocation efficiency in China’s iron 
and steel industry, but make the allocation less efficient.
Key words: productivity dynamics, industry regulation, market competition, China
JEL classification: L52
1. Introduction
The level of government microeconomic intervention and regulation has been 
significantly reduced since China’s all-round implementation of a market-oriented 
reform in 1994. Market openness, growing competition, the emergence of non-
state-owned enterprises, and the subsequent transformation of the market structure 
have characterized China’s economic and structural transitions (Naughton, 1992; 
McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Perkins, 2002; Li, et al., 2012). Further studies have 
indicated that market openness expedites market entries and exits of enterprises, 
which promote the market-oriented transition of resource allocation. The facilitation 
of market entries and exits increases the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) 
at the corporate level through competition but enhances the efficiency of resource 
allocation among enterprises, thus contributing to the overall TFP improvement at 
the aggregate level (Li et al., 2012).
However, China has retained extensive intervention and regulation in some 
important industries and economic sectors (the World Bank, 2013), and such 
intervention and regulation have been largely strengthened after 2003. The Chinese 
government in the process of a market-oriented reform substantially reduced the 
intensity of its regulation on the iron and steel industry, where the level of market 
openness greatly increased. Nevertheless, the Chinese government still attempted 
to maintain a strong influence on the iron and steel industry as a key industry for 
the economy and retained extensive regulatory measures. An interesting question 
for the industries in which the government has retained extensive intervention and 
regulation is whether limited market openness and competition have improved their 
overall industry productivity and whether the extensive microeconomic intervention 
retained by the government for this sector impedes the improvement of industry 
productivity.
Some studies believe that the market entry of many non-state-owned enterprises 
has led to excessive competition, repetitive construction, and overcapacity of many 
industries, including the iron and steel industry, and has caused the deterioration 
of productivity in these industries (Yang Huixin, 2000; Wei Houkai, 2003; Luo 
Yunhui, 2004). China’s central government holds a similar view that the large-scale 
entry of new enterprises in the iron and steel industry causes serious problems of 
repetitive construction or overcapacity, and it attempts to enforce a tight control of 
market access. Moreover, China’s central government has also adopted regulatory 
policies, such as an investment project review and approval and imposed control 
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on corporate investments for capacity expansion. The central government has also 
introduced an industrial policy to support state-owned large enterprises and restrict 
the development of small enterprises in the iron and steel industry (Jiang and Li, 
2010). Most of these state-owned iron and steel enterprises are inefficient but are 
still supported by the industrial policy of the central government. Moreover, these 
state-owned enterprises have the serious problem of soft budgetary constraint 
and are often bailed out by the government whenever threatened by potential 
bankruptcies.
Local governments in China also play an important role in the intervention of the 
development of iron and steel enterprises. Local governments help local enterprises 
escape the restrictions of regulatory policies introduced by the central government. 
For example, they give assistance to local enterprises to enter the iron and steel 
industry despite the central policy restrictions, or they give assistance to local 
iron and steel enterprises to expand their capacity despite the central government 
restrictions. Local governments also support the development of local iron and steel 
enterprises by offering cheap land, relaxing environmental regulation, and offering 
tax preferences and fiscal subsidies. These activities of the local governments 
are conducive to the entry of new enterprises that intensify market competition 
and promote the improvement of industrial efficiency. However, the protection 
and support of the local government to local enterprises may distort competition, 
disrupt the market mechanism of “survival of the fittest,” and impede efficiency 
improvement. 
The behaviors of iron and steel enterprises and the competitive landscape 
of the industry as a whole under the effect of different interventions of the 
central and local governments are distorted. The relationship among entry and 
exit, market competition, and industry aggregate TFP growth is also likely to 
experience aberration. This study attempts to verify whether such an aberration 
has occurred by revealing the relationship among the entry and exit of the iron 
and steel industry, market competition, and industry TFP growth through an 
empirical study. This study also discusses the far-reaching influence of limited 
market openness, government regulation, and intervention on the evolution of the 
efficiency of the iron and steel industry. This research is based on the theoretical 
foundation of the industrial evolution model by Hopenhayn (1992). Thus, this 
study proposes the hypothesis as follows: The entry-exit would promote the 
growth of the aggregate productivity, accompanied by improving cross-enterprise 
allocation efficiency.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature 
review of the current studies. Section 3 introduces the theoretical frameworks and 
methodologies used in the study. Section 4 presents the materials and variables 
used in the study and empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 
is conclusions.
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2. Literature review
Theoretical and empirical research has extensively pointed out that market 
competition is an important force in the promotion of TFP growth at the corporate 
level and in the efficiency enhancement of resource allocation at the cross-
enterprise level (Vickers, 1995; Nickell, 1996; Disney, Haskel and Heden, 2003; 
Syverson, 2004; Holmes and Schmitz, 2010). These studies suggest that the three 
channels exist for the enhancement of the overall industrial productivity through 
market competition. The first channel is the productivity improvement of existing 
enterprises in an industry. Existing enterprises increase productivity by adopting 
new technologies and adjusting their organizational structure, such as the reasonable 
allocation of corporate resources through internal restructuring. The second channel 
is the mechanism for the optimized cross-enterprise allocation of resources among 
existing enterprises; that is, market competition leads to the flow of market share 
and factor resources from inefficient enterprises to highly efficient enterprises to 
optimize the efficiency of resources within an industry. The third channel is the 
mechanism of market selection; that is, the entry of highly efficient enterprises into 
the market intensifies market competition and forces inefficient enterprises to exit 
the market. A number of studies have been conducted on enterprise competition 
behaviors. Barberá et al. (2013) studied the reliability and validity of industrial 
assets. Bendato et al. (2015) examined the adjustment of dynamic production 
systems under the fluctuation margin environment. 
Recent studies have begun to follow the TFP of China’s manufacturing enterprises 
and the effect on TFP at the industry level (Bartelsman et al., 2009; Hsieh and 
Klenow, 2009; Li Ping et al., 2011). These studies have suggested that productivity 
varies greatly across the enterprises of China’s manufacturing sectors with an 
inefficient resource allocation. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) argued that, if resources 
could be allocated to highly efficient enterprises of the manufacturing sectors in 
China and India similar to their counterparts of the United States, then the TFP of 
both countries could be increased by 30% to 50% and 40% to 60%, respectively. 
Brandt et al. (2009) used the data of China’s manufacturing enterprises between 
1998 and 2006 and found that resources flow from inefficient SOEs to highly 
efficient private enterprises, provided that the entry and exit of enterprises are based 
on free choice. Moreover, such a reallocation of resources further increases the TFP 
of China’s manufacturing sectors.
These studies are highly relevant for the understanding the TFP evolution of 
China’s manufacturing sectors and enterprises. However, these studies have 
neglected the potentially adverse effects of China’s institutional and policy defects 
on TFP distribution and evolution for manufacturing enterprises in China. China’s 
local governments allowed the market entry of inefficient firms and made market 
exit more difficult for inefficient ones by offering protection and subsidies for 
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local firms, These inefficient firms expanded their capacity and market share under 
various preferential policies offered by local governments. Hence, the market 
mechanism of the “survival of the fittest” failed to function effectively. China has 
introduced an industrial policy to “protect and support state-owned large enterprises 
and restrict the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises” in capital-
intensive industries, such as the iron and steel, petroleum, and chemical engineering 
industries. Such an industrial policy protects inefficient state-owned enterprises 
and accelerates their quantitative expansion. However, the development of efficient 
private small- and medium-sized enterprises is constrained (Jiang, et al., 2010). The 
iron and steel industry has been an important area in the subsidized competition 
and implementation of interventionist industrial policy by local governments over 
the years. Therefore, the study on the distribution and evolution of TFP and the 
productivity distribution and evolution of iron and steel enterprises offers valuable 
insights for the analysis of the adverse effects of China’s institutional and policy 
distortions on corporate productivity and the overall industrial productivity.
3. Methodology
3.1. Theoretical framework
The analysis of this study is built upon the theoretical foundation of the industrial 
evolution model of Hopenhayn (1992), which investigates an industry that 
consists of a multitude of manufacturers of homogeneous products with varying 
productivity. Each manufacturer determines the level of output according to 
factor input and stochastic productivity shock ζ. Productivity shock ζ is mutually 
independent for each manufacturer and conforms to the first-order Markov process. 
The productivity distribution function for the manufacturer in the future phase can 
be expressed as F(ζt+1|ζt), where F(ζt+1|ζt) is a strictly decreasing function of ζt. 
That is, the probability for a manufacturer to possess high productivity in a future 
period increases with the growth of the current phase productivity.
In each phase, an existing manufacturer makes the choice of whether to pay the 
fixed cost Cf and continue the operation or to exit the market before observing the 
realization of productivity shocks. The manufacturer determines the level of its 
output after observing the realization of the current phase of productivity shocks 
if the manufacturer elects to continue operation. Potential entrants choose whether 
or not to pay a sunk cost Ce for market entry. If it elects to enter the market, it 
will determine the level of its output according to the realization of productivity 
shocks with distribution function as G(ζ). Price is jointly decided by market 
demand and supply, and each manufacturer is a recipient of market price. This 
model generates two key endogenous variables: the access ratio of an industry 
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and the minimum productivity level ζ* required for an existing manufacturer to 
stay in the market. The sunk cost Ce of market access becomes a basic exogenous 
variable that affects the transformation of the market structure given that the 
model assumes the existence of homogeneous products and numerous buyers and 
sellers in the market.
The analytical result of this model is indicated as a basic exogenous variable 
of the model. Variations in the sunk cost Ce for market entry exert an important 
effect on the decision making of manufacturers for market entry and exit and 
for the variation of the market structure. Based on the given initial productivity 
distribution G(ζ), the discount profits required for an enterprise to compensate 
for the sunk cost of market entry decrease if the sunk cost of market entry 
decreases; this decrease encourages the entry of potential manufacturers. 
Manufacturers entering the market can observe the current-phase productivity 
ζt, and future productivity is expected to evolve on the track of distribution 
function F(ζt+1|ζt). Given that F(ζt+1|ζt) is a strictly decreasing function of ζt, an 
inefficient manufacturer develops an expectation of future low productivity and 
low expected profits. Therefore, if the productivity of enterprise ζt is below ζ* 
for the given minimum productivity level required to stay in market ζ*, it will 
opt to exit the market. However, manufacturers with productivity ζt above ζ* stay 
in the market, and their productivity and scale of production continuously grow 
over time. Enterprises with higher productivity enjoy a much rapid growth of 
their market share. The reductions of entry cost and the entry of new enterprises 
also increase the productivity level required to create a positive expected profit 
in the future, thus increasing the minimum productivity level ζ* required for an 
enterprise to stay in the market. Therefore, potential players enter the market 
because of the reduced sunk cost for entry, while less productive ones exit the 
market. Under an equilibrium state, significant entry and exit ratios are likely to 
occur, and a positive correlation exists between them.
The reduction of sunk cost for market entry has inspired a dynamic competition 
process based on the mechanism of market choice of the “survival of the fittest.” 
In this process of dynamic competition, the average productivity of exiting firms 
is below the average productivity of surviving firms, considering that exiting 
firms are mainly the least productive ones. Hopenhayn (1992) proved that F(ζt+1|ζt) 
has stochastic dominance for the initial productivity distribution of new entrants 
G(ζ) as long as F(ζt+1|ζt) is a strictly decreasing function of ζt, given that the 
productivity distribution of existing manufacturers is a result of the phase-out of 
inefficient ones. Therefore, existing manufacturers are more productive than new 
entrants. The evolving distribution of productivity and scale among manufacturers 
becomes an important source of productivity growth at the industry level in the 
dynamic process of competition driven by reducing sunk cost for market entry. 
The reduction of sunk cost for market entry and the resultant mass inflow of new 
Jianbai Huang et al. • Industry regulation, competition, and the dynamics of productivity... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2015 • vol. 33 • sv. 2 • 299-324 305
players have fueled productivity growth at the industry level. The reduction of 
sunk cost for market entry has increased the minimum required productivity level 
for existing manufacturers to stay in the market, and it provides incentives for the 
growth of corporate productivity at the micro level. However, the mechanism of 
market competition and choice through “survival of the fittest” gives rise to cross-
enterprise resource reallocation based on productivity. Production gradually shifts 
to more productive firms as less productive firms exit market. Thus, improvement 
in the efficiency of cross-enterprise resource allocation becomes an important 
source of TFP growth.
This theoretical model is based on certain assumptions, but the revealed mechanism 
of open competition provides an important reference for the analysis of market 
entry and exit for competitive industries and the evolution of market competition 
and TFP in the process of market-oriented reform and deregulation. The model also 
provides the theoretical benchmark for such an analysis of China’s iron and steel 
industry under the condition of limited market openness and extensive government 
interventions. The entry and exit of a large number of firms in a competitive 
industry of market entry deregulation inspire a dynamic competition process based 
on market choice. The reduction of sunk cost for market entry, the large-scale entry 
of non-state-owned enterprises, and the intensifying competition have increased the 
minimum productivity level required for firms to be profitable, and they incentivize 
microeconomic entities, including state-owned enterprises, to increase productivity. 
Less efficient firms in the process of market competition are driven out from the 
market and economic resources, and the share of production is gradually allocated 
to more productive firms. Given the significant differences in productivity level 
and the ownership structure across firms, the mechanism of market choice based 
on “survival of the fittest” and the cross-enterprise resource reallocation are likely 
to become drivers of gradual transition and important sources for TFP growth at the 
industry level. This industrial evolution model can be considered as a theoretical 
foundation to support the presented hypothesis.
3.2. Measurement of TFP
To measure the TFP of industries correctly, this study that is based on the Cobb–
Douglas production function follows the corporate production function developed 
by Syverson (2011) combined with a semi-parametric method developed by 
Levinshohn and Petrin (2003) to resolve the endogenous problem. The specific 
explanations are as follows:
According to Syverson (2011), assume that the corporate production function has 
the form of a Cobb–Douglas production function
 
, , ( , , , , )i t i tY F A K L α β= ,   (1)
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where Yi,t denotes the net output level of enterprise i during period t, K and L denote 
the capital and labor inputs, respectively, and α and β denote the output elasticity of 
capital and labor, respectively. Then, the TFP of enterprise i during period t can be 
defined as
 /it it it it itTFP A F K L
α β= = .  (2)
By taking the logarithm of both sides of Equation (1)
 
0it it it ity a k l uα β= + + + ,  (3)
where yit, kit, and lit denote the logarithm of Yit, Kit, and Lit, respectively. In Equation 
(3), the TFP uit of enterprise i during period t can be decomposed into two parts: 
one part is pure stochastic shock εit, and the other is a specific productivity shock 
ζit facing the enterprise, which includes certain important corporate and industrial 
attributes. Thus, Model (3) can be written a
 
0it it it it ity a k lα β ζ ε= + + + + .  (4)
The enterprise should respond to the variations of ζit under the assumption of profit 
maximization. The adjustable labor input lit is usually positively correlated with 
ζit, which causes the endogenous problem in the sense of econometric economics. 
Thus, the ordinary least square estimator of labor output elasticity generated by 
Model (4) is likely to have an upward deviation. Moreover, the estimator of capital 
output elasticity is likely to have the tendency of a negative deviation given that 
the volume of workforce employment is usually positively correlated with capital 
inventory. Therefore, the TFP estimated based on the ordinary least square method 
is deviated. The fixed effect estimation of Model (4) cannot completely eliminate 
the deviation caused by the explanation of the variable endogeneity given that ζit 
may change over time.
This study uses the semi-parametric method developed by Levinshohn and Petrin 
(2003) on the basis of Olley and Pakes (1996) to resolve the endogenous problem 
in the estimation of Model (4). The research assumes that the intermediate input mit 
of enterprise has monotonously increasing dependence on kit and ζit as follows:
 ( , )it it it itm m k ζ= .  (5)
It can express ζit as a function of capital and intermediate input mit using the inverse 
function of Equation (5).
  ( , )it it it itk mζ ζ= .  (6)
Moreover, ζit follows the first-order Markov process.
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, 1( / )it it i t itEζ ζ ζ σ−= + ,  (7)
where 𝜎it is not correlated with capital kit but may be correlated with lit. Therefore, 
based on Equation (7), Equation (4) can be expressed as
 ( , )it it it it it ity l k mβ ψ η= + + ,  (8)
where the non-parametric function
 
0( , ) ( , )it it it it it it itk m a k k mψ α ζ= + + .  (9)




it it ij it it iti j
y l k mδ β δ η
= =
= + + +∑ ∑ .  (10)
In this manner, α cannot be identified to arrive at the consistent evaluation of labor 
output elasticity β using the ordinary least square method for the estimation of 
Equation (10).





it ij it it it
i j
k m lδ δ β
= =
Ψ = + −∑∑   .  (11)
For any possible capital output elasticity α*, the estimator of ζit can be written as
 *
it it itkαζ = Ψ −  .  (12)
Then, the non-parametric consistent estimator of E(ζit|ζi,t-1) can be expressed as
.  (13)
With the given consistent estimators of β, E(ζit|ζi,t-1), and α*, the residue error of the 
sample production function can be written as
.  (14)





, 1min ( (it it it it i t
it
y l k Eβ −α − − α − ζ ζ∑
2| ))  .  (15)
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The Golden Section Search method is adopted to minimize Equation (15). Thus, it 
can be arrived at the consistent estimator of capital output elasticity α. The consistent 
evaluator of TFP at the corporate level can be estimated using the following equation: 
.  (16)
3.3. Measurement of the TFP growth mechanism
Based on the method of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and 
Krizan (2006), this study defines the aggregate productivity TFPt of one industry or 
the sum of several industries as the weighted average of TFP for various enterprises 
to further investigate the contribution of entry, exit, and market selection to the 
enhancement of industry TFP in a dynamic competition.
 
t it itTFP m TFP= ∑ ,  (17)
where mit is the weight that is usually denoted by the share of production of 
enterprise i. Equation (17) indicates that the aggregate productivity of an industry 
or the sum of several industries is subject to the following two factors: the corporate 
TFP TFPit at the micro level and the status of the allocation of economic resources 
across enterprises denoted by the share of production mit. Therefore, Equation (17) 
provides a statistical framework for the empirical analysis on the productivity effect 
of entry, exit, and dynamic competition.
This study investigates the effect of resource reallocation driven by the market entry 
and exit on the overall productivity of industrial sectors and compares the relative 
importance of productivity growth at the corporate level and the improvement in the 
efficiency of cross-enterprise resource allocation. Thus, it is needed to decompose 
the aggregate productivity growth defined by Equation (17). Baily, Hulten, and 
Campbell (1992) offered the following method of decomposition:
 
t it j it it it j it it it j it ji C i C i N i N
TFP m TFP m TFP m TFP m TFP− − − −∈ ∈ ∈ ∈∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − ∆∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
t it j it it it j it it it j it ji C i C i N i N




where C, N, and X respectively denote the sums of existing enterprises, new 
entrants, and exiting firms. On the basis of this decomposition method, Foster, 
Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2006) proposed the following method of decomposition:
 ( )
( ) ( )
t it j it it it j t j it iti C i C i C
it it t j it j it j t ji N i X
TFP m TFP m TFP TFP m TFP
m TFP TFP m TFP TFP
− − −∈ ∈ ∈
− − − −∈ ∈
∆ = ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ ∆
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4. Empirical data and analysis
4.1. Empirical data source
The data are derived from the database of China’s industrial enterprises between 
1999 and 2007 from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). This database has 
the following important characteristics. First, it includes all the four-digit industries 
of industrial sectors in each year between 1999 and 2007. Second, for each four-
digit industry, this database provides important information on the basic situation, 
financial status, and profitability of industrial legal personal enterprises above 
the designated scale, that is, all state-owned and non-state-owned industrial legal 
person enterprises with an annual main business revenue exceeding 5 million yuan. 
The information includes the company code, region, type of industry (four digits), 
capital composition, assets and liabilities, revenues and costs, intermediate input, 
and profit distribution. For example, in the survey year of 2004, enterprises covered 
in this database account for 71.2% of the total industrial aggregate employment and 
90.7% of the entire industrial aggregate output. Therefore, the database provides a 
comprehensive overview of the industrial organization status of various industries 
of China’s industrial sectors. Third, unless mergers or reorganizations occur, the 
code for each and every enterprise in this database is unique and constant. It helps 
to conveniently identify each enterprise and permits the tracking of inter-temporal 
variations of each enterprise.
There are two following adjustments have been made to this database. First, 
this research deletes the erroneous records that are illogical in reference to the 
methodology of Li Yuhong, Wang Hao, and Zheng Yuxin (2008). A record is 
considered an erroneous record and is deleted if an observation value meets any 
of the following four criteria: (1) the corporate aggregate output value is negative, 
(2) the various inputs of an enterprise are negative, (3) the original value of the 
corporate fixed assets is smaller than the net value of the fixed assets, and (4) the 
industrial value-added or intermediate input is greater than the gross industrial 
output value.
4.2. Variables
According to company code and year, this research selects enterprises come from 
four iron and steel sectors, namely, steel smelting, iron smelting, steel rolling and 
processing, and iron alloy smelting, as cross-section units and large-scale non-
equilibrium micro-level panel datasets between 1999 and 2007, including 41,113 
observation values. Each observation value consists of 50 variables that reflect 
the basic situation, input and output, assets and liabilities, capital composition, 
revenues and costs, and profit distribution of firms. The study then creates variables 
of the following three aspects based on the dataset:
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a. Corporate net output level
The database of China’s industrial enterprises reports the overall output level, 
sales revenue, and industrial value-added of each enterprise. This study adopts the 
deflated industrial value added by the ex-factory price index i of industrial goods 
in various regions that equal 1 in 1999 as the net output level for each enterprise 
Yit. However, this database does not report the industrial value added of each 
enterprise in 2004. Therefore, as referenced the methodology of Liu Xiaoxuan and 
Li Shuangjie (2008) to estimate the industrial value added of each enterprise using 
the following equation:
Corporate value-added = current-year sales revenue + end-of-phase finished 
products – beginning-of-phase finished products – intermediate inputs + current-
year VAT volume.
In this equation, with the exception of beginning-of-phase finished products, 
original data in the database of China’s industrial enterprises can all be found in 
the database of China’s industrial enterprises. Liu Xiaoxuan and Li Shuangjie 
(2008) replaced the data of end-of-phase and beginning-of-phase finished products 
with end-of-phase and beginning-of-phase inventory to address the lack of data on 
beginning-of-phase finished goods. Given that the database of China’s industrial 
enterprises reports end-of-phase inventory, end-of-phase finished products, and 
beginning-of-phase inventory, this study estimates beginning-of-phase finished 
products from beginning-of-phase inventory according to the share of end-of-phase 
finished products in end-of-phase inventory to calculate the value added of various 
enterprises more reasonably.
b. Corporate capital inventory
In the production theories of economics, capital input should be fixed capital 
inventory when actual input goes into production. Thus, this research employs the 
perpetual inventory method to calculate corporate capital inventory Kit.
 
1it it it itK K I D−= + − .
The perpetual inventory method requires us to determine the original capital 
inventory of each enterprise, actual investment volume of fixed assets in each 
year Iit, and depreciation volume Dit. This study utilizes the net value of fixed 
assets of each enterprise in 1999. or the net value of fixed assets corresponding 
to the year that the enterprise first appears in the database converted to the real 
values of 1999 according to the fixed asset investment price index of various 
regions, as the initial capital inventory of enterprises. The database of China’s 
industrial enterprises does not directly report the fixed asset investment volume 
at the corporate level, but rather it reports the original values of fixed assets of 
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each enterprise in each year. These values enable the calculation of the nominal 
investment volume of individual years at the corporate level according to the 
difference between the original values of fixed assets in two adjacent years. The 
nominal investment volume is then converted to the real value of 1999 according 
to the fixed asset investment price index of various regions. The database of 
China’s industrial enterprises directly reports the current-year depreciation values 
of various enterprises. This study converts these values into the real values of 
1999 using the fixed asset investment price index of various regions. This study 
then estimates the real capital inventory of each enterprise in each year according 
to the above equation.
c. Labor input and intermediate input
The database of China’s industrial enterprises reports the annual average number 
employed for each enterprise, which is used as the measurement of corporate labor 
input. This database reports the intermediate input of enterprises that is adjusted to 
the constant price of 1998 using the ex-factory price index of industrial goods from 
various regions as the measurement of intermediate input for various enterprises.
4.3. Empirical analysis
Table 1 explains the entry and exit situation of China’s iron and steel industry. 
This study calculates the entry ratio ER and exit ratio XR of four-digit sectors 
using the data of China’s iron and steel enterprises for four-digit sectors between 
1999 and 2007. The definition of entrants and exiting firms is based on the 
database of China’s industrial enterprises. This research defines enterprises 
that first appear in the database since 2000 as entrants. Enterprises that used to 
but ceased to appear in the database from a certain year are defined as exiting 
firms of the year. NE(t), NX(t), and NT(t) denote the number of entrants, the 
number of exiting firms, and the total number of enterprises of industry in year 
t, respectively. Entry ratio and exit ratio can be calculated using the following 
equation:
ER(t) = NE(t)/NT(t–1)          XR(t) = NX(t)/NT(t–1)
In detail, Table 1 reports the average entry ratio, exit ratio, and institutional 
structures of entrants and exiting firms from the four four-digit sectors of China’s 
iron and steel industry, namely, iron smelting (IS), steel smelting (SS), steel rolling 
and processing (SP), and iron alloy smelting (AS), between 1999 and 2007.
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Table 1: The Entry-Exit situation in China’s iron and steel sector
Year
Sector IS Sector SS Sector SP Sector AS
ER (%) XR (%) ER (%) XR (%) ER (%) XR (%) ER (%) XR (%)
2000 
17.32 3.57 24.39 1.83 22.10 3.65 23.02 2.93 
(79.20) (20.52) (41.95) (60.28) (70.62) (8.42) (46.79) (52.25)
2001 
22.62 20.84 18.91 27.36 31.65 16.96 31.85 16.60 
(19.06) (27.00) (41.09) (84.98) (11.26) (19.02) (26.59) (49.15)
2002 
23.94 22.31 19.89 12.15 22.72 12.56 20.93 13.67 
(16.14) (35.43) (69.11) (2.44) (60.79) (91.34) (17.43) (61.47)
2003 
35.89 25.54 32.83 12.63 26.31 11.27 40.98 11.47 
(4.08) (25.37) (3.14) (76.25) (30.50) (30.51) (25.30) (30.15)
2004 
66.46 27.85 69.66 23.50 83.45 16.06 102.64 17.92 
(1.82) (16.16) (5.48) (62.17) (18.39) (67.30) (11.00) (36.21)
2005 
18.22 17.45 17.39 16.23 11.66 20.41 16.79 18.23 
(4.25) (2.75) (25.26) (4.97) (3.71) (16.79) (21.20) (19.42)
2006 
19.82 17.04 20.11 17.24 20.95 9.81 19.12 12.80 
(3.46) (9.07) (42.36) (22.47) (14.55) (14.01) (7.87) (0.15)
2007 
14.33 22.44 13.39 8.26 19.11 8.26 17.16 12.71 
(3.96) (5.23) (0.34) (63.96) (12.38) (36.17) (5.04) (9.16)
Note: The numbers in brackets report the shares of non-state-owned capital in the capital 
 aggregate of entrants and exiting firms for industrial sectors. 
Source: The materials are taken from the NBS
The annual average entry ratio is 27.3% for the steel smelting sector, 27.1% for the 
steel smelting sector, 29.7% for the steel rolling and processing sector, and 34.1% 
for the iron alloy smelting sector. The annual average exit ratio is 19.6% for the 
iron smelting sector, 16.8% for the steel smelting sector, 12.4% for the steel rolling 
and processing sector, and 13.3% for the iron alloy smelting sector. 
The numbers in brackets in Table 1 report the shares of state-owned capital for 
entrants and exiting firms. It shows that the share of state-owned capital in the 
entrants of the iron smelting sector is below 20% for years other than the first 
year of reporting, and the lowest is only 3.46%. In the iron alloy smelting sector, 
the share of state-owned capital in the entrants is below 50% for all reporting 
years, and the lowest is only 5.4%. The share of state-owned capital is below 
30% in the entrants of the steel rolling and processing sector, with the exception 
of a few years. The shares of state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital are 
relatively balanced among the entrants of the steel smelting sector. Nevertheless, 
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the share of state-owned capital in the entrants remains below 6% in 2003, 2004, 
and 2007, and even 1% in some years, for the steel smelting sector. The share 
of state-owned capital is below 36% in the reporting years for the exiting firms 
of the iron and steel industry, and the lowest is only 2.75%. With the exception 
of 52.25% in 2000 and 61.47% in 2002, the share of state-owned capital in the 
exiting firms of the iron alloy smelting sector is below 50%, and the lowest in 
2006 is only 0.15%. The share of state-owned capital among the exiting firms in 
the iron smelting and iron alloy smelting sectors has been on a significant decline 
over the years. The share of state-owned capital is relatively balanced for the 
exiting firms of the steel smelting sector. However, the average share of state-
owned capital across years is still less than 50% in addition to the declining trend 
over the years. Among the exiting firms of the steel rolling and processing sector, 
the share of state-owned capital is below 37% for the other six reporting years, 
with the exception of two years of 2002 and 2004, and its trend line continues to 
demonstrate a weak decline over the years.
Table 2 analyses the cross-enterprise TFP growth and distribution by estimated the 
TFP at the corporate level based on the above semi-parametric method mentioned 
on section 3.2. This study discovers that stable parametric estimation values exist 
for the production function of all industries in different sections, and thus the 
analysis is created on the basis of comparable TFP.
Table 2 reports the cross-enterprise TFP distribution of the four four-digit sectors 
of the iron and steel industry. Table 2 presents three striking characteristics: First, 
the TFP of the upper quartile enterprises is at least three times higher than that 
of the lower quartile enterprises, with the exception of the steel smelting sector 
in 1999. Second, each part of the cross-enterprise TFP distribution, such as the 
lower quartile, median quartile, and upper quartile, all experience growth, and 
the growth rate of the upper quartile is greater than that of the median and lower 
quartiles. Third, productivity varies greatly among firms, the ratios between the 
average TFP of upper quartile enterprises and the average TFP of lower quartile 
enterprises in iron smelting, steel smelting, steel rolling and processing, and iron 
alloy smelting sectors for 1999 are 2.79, 5.65, 4.46, and 4.06, respectively. The 
ratios between the average TFP of upper quartile enterprises and that of lower 
quartile enterprises in iron smelting, steel smelting, steel rolling and processing, 
and iron alloy smelting sectors increase to 5.74, 13.4, 5.71, and 4.38 times in 
2007, respectively. 
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Table 2: Cross-enterprise TFP distribution of China’s industry 
TFP
Sector IS Sector SS
< 25% 25%–50% > 75% < 25% 25%–50% > 75%
1999 326.75 523.74 913.24 146.28 268.00 826.17 
2000 282.48 517.55 939.83 137.30 259.10 808.03 
2001 329.57 636.83 1155.74 197.39 433.85 1285.37 
2002 376.53 749.72 1489.66 235.29 508.82 1548.44 
2003 489.51 1027.83 2149.52 247.13 709.74 2044.89 
2004 458.33 1110.87 2671.25 268.65 747.10 2786.66 
2005 600.64 1423.96 3124.41 282.42 1007.88 2703.22 
2006 588.28 1410.50 3211.20 303.11 1006.57 3308.00 
2007 771.55 1766.58 4428.43 264.62 1151.48 3546.44 
TFP
Sector SP Sector AS
< 25% 25%–50% > 75% < 25% 25%–50% > 75%
1999 214.88 397.42 872.01 385.21 754.68 1567.44 
2000 206.42 429.71 927.60 409.32 784.07 1604.55 
2001 222.69 438.12 992.87 424.75 843.62 1685.30 
2002 251.74 484.15 1115.66 490.05 990.09 1978.51 
2003 309.64 619.86 1368.68 584.35 1217.80 2519.46 
2004 253.97 542.94 1294.40 728.80 1411.91 2899.52 
2005 316.30 718.52 1676.06 785.01 1605.68 3376.18 
2006 342.20 769.31 1843.09 924.36 2118.15 4318.66 
2007 396.51 905.51 2266.97 1333.68 2797.27 5843.59 
Note: In this table, 25th, 50th, and 75th denote the lower, median, and upper quartiles, respectively. 
Source: The materials are taken from the NBS
Tables 3–6 explain TFP Growth mechanism. Item (1) is the contribution to TFP 
growth by existing enterprises weighted by their market share in the base period, 
and it is identical to the first item in Equation (18). Item (2) is the contribution 
of market share reallocation among existing enterprises to the growth of aggregate 
productivity. Item (3) is the coordinated variation; that is, this item is positive if 
productivity and market share move in the same direction. The sum between Items 
(2) and (3) measures the contribution of cross-enterprise resource reallocation to 
the growth of aggregate productivity, which is equivalent to the second item in 
Equation (18). Item (4) denotes the productivity of new entrants. If the productivity 
of new entrants is higher than that of the aggregate productivity of base period, 
it will be greater than zero. On the contrary, if the productivity of new entrants 
is below the aggregate productivity during base period, it will be smaller than 
zero. Item (5) denotes the productivity of exiting enterprises. If the productivity 
of exiting firms is above the aggregate productivity of the base period, it will be 
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greater than zero. On the contrary, if the productivity of exiting firms is below that 
of the base period, it will be smaller than zero. The difference between Items (4) 
and (5) measures the contribution of the market entry and exit to the growth of 
aggregate productivity, and they are quantitatively equivalent to the difference 
between the last two items of Equation (18).
Table 3: Results of the decomposition of the aggregate productivity growth volume 
for the iron smelting sector
Sector IS
Time Period
Specification of TFP Growth
Subtotal Total TFP 
GrowthSurvival Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2)+(3) (4)−(5)
1999–2000 −228.33 39.01 112.41 −358.37 −75.72 151.42 −282.65 −356.59 
1999–2001 1730.49 −30.59 −17.10 358.96 −475.55 −47.69 834.51 2502.60 
1999–2002 2139.49 −645.55 −280.11 2437.78 −1141.06 −925.66 3578.84 4801.90 
1999–2003 4977.59 −1178.01 −649.95 2725.18 −1563.77 −1827.96 4288.95 7433.40 
1999–2004 8191.84 −719.80 −2446.07 8558.87 −1533.99 −3165.87 10092.86 15120.17 
1999–2005 4739.94 −487.75 −564.20 5929.23 −920.67 −1051.95 6849.90 10536.89 
1999–2006 13879.67 −639.32 −3118.79 2986.88 −2178.23 −3758.11 5165.11 15263.75 
1999–2007 20291.11 −646.44 −3424.01 6125.01 −2273.30 −4070.45 8398.31 24617.34 
Source: The materials are taken from the NBS
Table 3 reports the results of the decomposition of the growth volume of 
aggregate productivity for the iron smelting sector. Item (1) of the decomposition 
result indicates that the productivity growth of existing enterprises plays a major 
role in the growth of aggregate productivity. Item (2) of the decomposition 
result is negative, and it indicates that enterprises with a TFP that is below the 
aggregate productivity during the base period experience faster growth. The 
result of Item (3) is negative, and it explains that no variation exists in the same 
direction between the productivity growth of existing enterprises and the growth 
of market share. The sum between Items (2) and (3) is negative, and it means that 
the efficiency of cross-enterprise resource allocation is worsening and impedes 
the improvement of the industry aggregate productivity. Item (4) is greater 
than zero, and it indicates that new entrants have promoted the improvement of 
industry productivity. Item (5) is smaller than zero, and it means that less efficient 
enterprises are driven out from the market. The difference between Items (4) and 
(5) is far greater than zero, and it indicates that after the weighting of market 
share, entry and exit have made important contributions to the improvement of 
industry productivity.
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Specification of TFP Growth Subtotal Total TFP 
GrowthSurvival Entry Exit(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2)+(3) (4)−(5)
1999–2000 1301.02 52.41 14.65 −89.59 −7.07 67.06 −82.52 1288.48 
1999–2001 1703.84 −77.89 −37.15 7.74 −223.71 −115.04 231.45 1814.08 
1999–2002 2743.84 −326.39 −352.55 −85.81 −328.37 −678.94 242.56 2319.08 
1999–2003 5058.67 −681.90 −1178.05 498.67 −448.79 −1859.95 947.46 4152.42 
1999–2004 6323.93 −682.79 −792.03 −280.71 −615.46 −1474.82 334.75 5181.79 
1999–2005 8032.07 −754.22 −1827.52 498.09 −740.36 −2581.74 1238.45 6687.21 
1999–2006 9140.78 −899.26 −1799.19 1326.78 −751.34 −2698.45 2078.12 8515.79 
1999–2007 7179.22 −1002.39 −1095.85 2287.61 −756.21 −2098.24 3043.82 8124.60 
Source: The materials are taken from the NBS
Table 4 reports the results of the decomposition of the aggregate productivity 
growth for the steel smelting sector. Its overall situation is similar to that of the 
iron smelting sector; that is, the productivity growth of existing enterprises plays 
a major role in the aggregate productivity growth, and market entries and exits are 
key contributors to the improvement of industry productivity. At the same time, 
the efficiency of cross-enterprises resource allocation for existing enterprises is 
worsening and impedes productivity improvement at the industry aggregate level.
Table 5: Result of the decomposition of the aggregate productivity growth volume 
for the steel rolling and processing sector
Sector SP
Time Period
Specification of TFP Growth
Subtotal Total TFP 
GrowthSurvival Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2)+(3) (4)−(5)
1999–2000 973.29 −64.22 101.63 4327.01 −94.70 37.41 4421.71 5433.02 
1999–2001 2192.24 −29.47 283.10 2698.33 −283.85 253.63 2982.18 5428.33 
1999–2002 4233.90 37.54 446.96 3130.64 3276.73 484.50 −146.09 4563.40 
1999–2003 8420.03 33.64 −20.17 5596.38 3172.95 13.47 2423.43 10845.70 
1999–2004 17520.50 403.31 −1576.49 6065.92 2776.55 −1173.18 3289.37 19627.36 
1999–2005 21117.13 20.33 −2484.00 7218.22 2408.76 −2463.67 4809.46 23405.10 
1999–2006 20252.63 95.62 −3073.38 7049.35 2509.36 −2977.76 4539.99 21840.64 
1999–2007 25820.86 −186.84 −4087.34 8045.49 2060.95 −4274.18 5984.54 27517.86 
Source: The materials are taken from the NBS
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Table 5 reports the results of the decomposition of the growth volume of aggregate 
TFP for the steel rolling and processing sector. Its overall situation is identical to 
that of the iron smelting and steel smelting sectors; that is, productivity growth 
of existing enterprises plays a major role in aggregate productivity growth, and 
market entries and exits are key contributors to the improvement of industry 
productivity. At the same time, cross-enterprise resource allocation efficiency for 
existing enterprises is worsening and impedes the productivity improvements at the 
aggregate industry level. Nevertheless, the mechanism for the TFP evolution of the 
steel rolling and processing sector has its own characteristics. The deterioration in 
the cross-enterprise allocation efficiency for existing enterprises is mainly derived 
from Item (3); that is, the productivity growth of enterprises moves in the opposite 
direction of the reduction of market share.
Table 6: Results of the decomposition of the aggregate productivity growth for the 
iron alloy smelting sector
Sector AS
Time Period
Specification of TFP Growth Subtotal Total TFP 
GrowthSurvival Entry Exit(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2)+(3) (4)−(5)
1999–2000 −599.07 186.67 331.95 −132.84 −39.75 518.62 −93.09 −172.95 
1999–2001 −488.34 39.11 308.56 −537.63 −203.38 347.67 −334.25 −471.37 
1999–2002 −374.36 −284.05 734.78 −248.92 −396.28 450.73 147.36 209.64 
1999–2003 370.49 −608.26 662.08 367.52 −592.13 53.82 959.65 1374.97 
1999–2004 2990.84 −88.41 −1019.80 2884.71 25.80 −1108.21 2858.91 4748.56 
1999–2005 3539.91 −285.08 −1376.36 4919.61 −377.29 −1661.44 5296.90 7171.08 
1999–2006 3892.89 −159.23 −94.00 9962.11 −420.81 −253.23 10382.92 14031.31 
1999–2007 8258.61 −296.38 −2954.62 13144.56 −483.61 −3251.00 13628.17 18632.73 
Source: The materials are taken from the NBS
Table 6 reports the results of the decomposition of aggregate productivity growth for 
the iron alloy smelting sector. Its overall situation is somewhat different from that of 
the iron smelting, steel smelting and steel rolling, and processing sectors. That is, in 
the iron alloy smelting sector, market entries and exits play a major role in the growth 
of aggregate productivity, while the productivity growth of existing enterprises is 
the second most important contributor to the improvement of industry aggregate 
productivity. The efficiency of cross-enterprise resource allocation for existing 
enterprises also demonstrates a worsening tendency and impedes the improvement of 
productivity at the aggregate industry level. Nevertheless, similar to the steel rolling 
and processing sector, deterioration in the cross-enterprise allocation efficiency for 
existing enterprises is mainly derived from Item (3); that is, the productivity growth 
of enterprises moves in the opposite direction to the reduction of market share.
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5. Results and discussion
Considering the exhibition of entry-exit situation in China’s iron and steel industry, 
First of all, the four-digit sectors of China’s iron and steel industry demonstrate 
very high market entry and exit ratios Geroski (1991) found that the average 
entry ratio of industrial sectors is only between 3.2% and 8.2% for sophisticated 
market economies, and the exit ratio is slightly lower. The market entry and exit 
ratios of China’s iron and steel industry far exceed those of the industrial sectors 
in sophisticated market economies. Therefore, large-scale market entries and exits 
of enterprises occur with the limited market openness of the iron and steel industry 
and local government assistance for local firms to escape market access restrictions. 
Moreover, the attempt of the central government to adopt a relatively strict market 
entry policy failed to achieve its expected objectives. Secondly, non-state-owned 
capital has become a major driver of the market entry and exit of the iron and steel 
industry. The market entry and exit of an industry are mainly driven by non-state-
owned capital, and the share of state-owned capital has been on a significant decline 
over the years.
In cross-firm TFP growth and distribution analysis in Table 2, there are three 
characters explored: First, as described by the industrial evolution model of 
Hopenhayn (1992), substantial TFP differences exist among enterprises in each 
year. Second, the minimum productivity level required for enterprises to remain 
in the market may have increased over time, and that the cross-enterprise TFP 
distribution demonstrates the tendency to move to the right. Moreover, more 
productive enterprises have achieved better growth. Third, productivity varies 
greatly among firms, cross-enterprise resource allocation for the iron and steel 
industry is inefficient, and such inefficiency demonstrates the tendency of 
further deterioration. Instead of promoting the convergence of corporate TFP, 
market competition under limited market openness and government intervention 
exacerbated the corporate TFP differences.
According to the analysis of Table 3-6, TFP growth mechanism, the results show 
that the decomposition of the aggregate productivity growth for the iron smelting 
sector, steel smelting sector, and steel rolling and processing sector are similar, 
that is, the productivity growth of existing enterprises plays a major role in the 
aggregate productivity growth, and market entries and exits are key contributors to 
the improvement of industry productivity. At the same time, the efficiency of cross-
enterprises resource allocation for existing enterprises is worsening and impedes 
productivity improvement at the industry aggregate level. There is a difference 
in the iron alloy smelting sector, market entries and exits play a major role in 
the growth of aggregate productivity, while the productivity growth of existing 
enterprises is the second most important contributor to the improvement of industry 
aggregate productivity. Nevertheless, the mechanism for TFP evolution of two 
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sectors, which are the steel rolling and processing sector and iron alloy smelting 
sector, have their own characteristics, while the deterioration in the cross-enterprise 
allocation efficiency for existing enterprises is mainly derived from Item (3); that 
is, the productivity growth of enterprises moves in the opposite direction of the 
reduction of market share.
On the whole, for the iron and steel industry, first, productivity of existing 
enterprises for the iron and steel industry has been rising rapidly and plays an 
important role in the aggregate productivity growth. Second, market entries and 
exits are the major sources for the aggregate productivity growth after the weighting 
of the market share. The TFP of entrants are a major contributor to the growth of 
aggregate productivity, and enterprises with a relatively low TFP are driven out of 
the market. Cross-enterprise resource allocation efficiency deteriorates for existing 
enterprises. Enterprises with TFP below the aggregate productivity during the base 
period experience faster growth, and corporate productivity and market share do 
not move in the same direction. 
Based on the above results, the study has the following implications: Although 
the central government has attempted to impose a relatively tight regulation 
on the market entry of the iron and steel industry, local government protection 
and assistance have made it easy for enterprises and investors to escape such a 
regulation. As a result, large-scale corporate entries and exits occurred for the iron 
and steel industry during the reporting period of this paper. Tremendous efficiency 
gaps exist among enterprises in the iron and steel industry. This finding reflects the 
inefficiency of cross-enterprise resource allocation for the iron and steel industry. 
Differences in productivity among enterprises widened instead of narrowed during 
the reporting period. This situation is another reflection of further deterioration 
in the efficiency of cross-enterprise resource allocation for the iron and steel 
industry. Large-scale corporate entries and exits for the iron and steel industry 
have intensified competition within the industry and significantly propelled the 
efficient improvement of existing iron and steel enterprises. The market entry of 
many relatively efficient new entrants in the iron and steel industry has driven out 
the less efficient manufacturers from the market. This process has greatly enhanced 
the overall efficiency of the iron and steel industry. Different from the standard 
theory, the efficiency of cross-enterprise resource allocation has failed to improve 
and has continued to worsen and seriously impede the overall improvement of the 
industry’s overall productivity, although the large-scale corporate entries and exits 
of China’s iron and steel industry have intensified market competition.
China’s central government should relax its regulation of the iron and steel industry, 
adjust the industrial policy that restricts competition to support large enterprises and 
eliminate smaller ones, introduce an industrial policy that promotes fair competition 
and put a premium on environmental protection, and restrain various subsidies 
and preferential policies of local governments for local enterprises. By taking 
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these measures, China’s central government can promote the fair competition of 
the iron and steel industry, thus enabling the competition mechanism of the market 
based on “survival of the fittest,” facilitating the concentration of resources and 
market share in highly efficient enterprises, and expediting the improvement of 
resource allocation efficiency in the iron and steel industry. Moreover, China has 
also retained many intervention and regulatory measures in various sectors of 
machinery, automobiles, basic metals, and chemical engineering, where local 
governments are enthusiastic to intervene. The Chinese government should create 
an open, fair, and transparent environment for market competition at an early date 
to promote the efficient improvement of these sectors.
6. Conclusions
The results of the empirical analysis did not strongly support the hypothesis, 
although the entry-exit promotes the growth of the aggregate productivity, the 
cross-enterprise resource allocation efficiency actually slows down aggregate 
productivity growth. The results of this research are the productivity growth 
of existing enterprises and entry–exit behaviors play an important role in the 
aggregate productivity growth, however, the efficiency of cross-enterprises 
resource allocation for existing enterprises is worsening and impedes productivity 
improvement at the industry aggregate level. The main contribution of this research 
to the previous literature is, studied dynamics of productivity growth on the basis 
of a limited market openness background. The previous researches are base on a 
free competition market background, but in China’s iron and steel industry, the 
government retained extensive intervention and regulation. The basic conclusion 
is that, with substantial government intervention in enterprise investments, market 
competition may not promote optimal resource allocation efficiency in China’s iron 
and steel industry, but will make the allocation less efficient.
The worsening efficiency in the dynamic cross-enterprise resource allocation for 
China’s iron and steel industry may have the following explanations. (1) In the iron 
and steel industry, the Chinese government has introduced an industrial policy to 
“support state-owned large iron and steel enterprises and restrict the development 
of small- and medium-sized enterprises.” Moreover, the government has retained a 
multitude of policy measures of microeconomic intervention, including investment 
regulation and market access. These policy measures have restricted the further 
development of many highly efficient private small- and medium-sized iron and steel 
enterprises but have fueled the development of many less efficient state-owned iron 
and steel enterprises, thus impeding the concentration of resources and markets in 
more efficient firms. (2) By offering cheap land and illegally relaxing environmental 
regulation, local governments have protected and supported local iron and steel 
enterprises. Therefore, many inefficient iron and steel enterprises have benefited from 
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the cost advantage and have further developed and prospered. This situation creates 
an unfavorable effect on the development of more efficient enterprises.
Given data limitations, this study investigates China’s iron and steel industry 
between 1999 and 2007, which is a period of rapid development for this specific 
industry. Nevertheless, growth in the market share of China’s iron and steel industry 
has significantly slowed in recent years. This study cannot reflect the entry and exit, 
market competition, and TFP growth of China’s iron and steel industry in recent 
years as well as characteristics of the intrinsic correlation among them. Future 
studies may explore the following directions: (1) further extend the investigation 
period to the recent couple of years on the basis of access to relevant data and 
(2) extend the scope of investigation to the automobile, machinery, and chemical 
engineering sectors in China.
The results of this paper suggest that the Chinese government should create an 
open, fair and transparent environment for market competition as soon as practically 
possible to promote the efficient improvement of these sectors and restrain various 
subsidies and preferential policies of local governments to local enterprises. In 
order to accelerate the growth of global economy, industry regulation should be 
reduced, fair competition should be protected and a premium put on environmental 
protection. 
References
Baily, M. N., Hulten, C., and Campbell, D. (1992) “Productivity Dynamics in 
Manufacturing Plants”, Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, Vol. 4, No 1, pp. 
187–267, doi: 10.2307/2534764.
Barberá, L., Viveros, P., Nikulin C, et al. (2013) “Aplicación de métodos para la 
resolución de problemas en un caso industrial”, Dyna, Vol. 2013, No. 88, pp. 
370–374.
Bartelsman, E., Haltiwanger, J., & Scarpetta, S. (2009) “Measuring and Analyzing 
Cross-country Differences in Firm Dynamics”, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc., pp. 15–76, doi: 10.7208/chicago/9780226172576.003.0002.
Bendato, I., Cassettari, L., Mosca, M., Mosca, R., & Rolando, F. (2015). “New 
Markets Forecast and Dynamic Production Redesign Through Stochastic 
Simulation”. International Journal of Simulation Modelling, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 
485–498, doi: 10.2507/IJSIMM14(3)10.307.
Brandt, L., Van Biesebroeck, J., & Zhang, Y. (2012) “Creative Accounting or Creative 
Destruction? Firm-Level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufacturing”, 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 339–351, doi: 10.1016/j.
jdeveco.2011.02.002.
Jianbai Huang et al. • Industry regulation, competition, and the dynamics of productivity... 
322 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2015 • vol. 33 • sv. 2 • 299-324
Disney, R., Haskel, J., & Heden, Y. (2003) “Entry, Exit and Establishment Survival 
in UK Manufacturing”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 51, No. 1, 
pp. 91–112, doi: 10.1111/1467-6451.00193.
Foster, L., Haltiwanger, J., & Krizan, C. J. (2006) “Market Selection, Reallocation, 
and Restructuring in the US Retail Trade Sector in the 1990s”, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 88, No. 4, pp. 748–758, doi: 10.1162/rest.88.4.748.
Geroski, P. A. (Ed.) (1991) “Entry and Market Contestability: An International 
Comparison”. Blackwell., pp. 257–281.
Holmes, T. J., & Schmitz, J. A., (2010) “Competition and Productivity: a Review 
of Evidence”, DIANE Publishing, Vol. 2, pp. 619–642, doi: 10.1146/annurev.
economics.102308.124407.
Hopenhayn, H. A. (1992) “Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run 
Equilibrium”, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, Vol. 60, No. 5, 
pp. 1127–1150, doi: 10.2307/2951541.
Hsieh, C. T., and Klenow, P. (2009) “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in 
China and India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 124, No 4, pp. 1403–
1448, doi: 10.3386/w13290.
Jiang, F., and Li, X. (2010) “Direct Market Intervention and Restrict Competition: 
The Orientation of China’s Industrial Policy and Its Fundamental Defects”, 
China Industrial Economics, Vol. 270, No. 9, pp. 26–36.
Levinshohn, J., and Petrin, A. (2003) “Estimating Production Functions Using 
Inputs to Control for Unobservables”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 70, No. 
2, pp. 317–341, doi: 10.1111/1467-937X.00246.
Li, P., Jian, Z. & Jiang, F. (2012) “Entry-exit, Competition and the Productivity of 
China’s Industry”, Journal of Quantitative & Technical Economics, Vol. 2012, 
No 9, pp. 3–21.
Li, Y., Wang, H., and Zheng, Y. (2008) “Enterprise Evolution: Important Path of 
Industrial TFP Growth in China”, Economic Research Journal, Vol. 2008, No. 
6, pp. 12–24.
Liu, X., and Li, S. (2008) “Measurement, Comparison and Exogenous Determinants 
of the Relative Efficiency of China’s Manufacturing Enterprises (2000–2004)”, 
China Economic Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 843–868.
Luo, Y., and Xia, D. (2002) “The Theoretical Basis of the Existence of Excessive 
Competition in a Market Economy”, Economic Science, Vol. 2002, No. 4, pp. 
97–108.
McMillan J. and Naughton, B. (1992) “How to Reform a Planned Economy: Lessons 
from China”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 130–143, 
doi: 10.1093/oxrep/8.1.130.
Naughton, B. (1992) “Implications of the State Monopoly over Industry 
and Its Relaxation”, Modern China, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 14–41, doi: 
10.1177/009770049201800102.
Jianbai Huang et al. • Industry regulation, competition, and the dynamics of productivity... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2015 • vol. 33 • sv. 2 • 299-324 323
Nickell, S. J. (1996) “Competition and Corporate Performance”, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 104, No. 4, pp. 724–746, doi: 10.1086/262040.
Olley, G. S., and Pakes, A. (1996) “The Dynamics of Productivity in the 
Telecommunications Equipment Industry”, Econometrica, Vol. 64, No. 6, pp. 
1263–1297, doi: 10.2307/2171831.
Perkins, D. H. (2002) “The Challenge China’s Economy Poses for Chinese 
Economists”, China Economic Review, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 412–418, doi: 
10.1016/S1043-951X(02)00099-8.
Syverson, C. (2004) “Market Structure and Productivity: A Concrete Example”. 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 112, No. 6, pp. 1181–1222, doi: 
10.1086/424743.
Syverson, C., (2011). “What Determines Productivity?”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 326–365, doi: 10.1257/jel.49.2.326.
The World Bank and the State Council Development Research Centre (2013) 
“China in 2030”, China Finance and Economics Press, pp. 25–33.
Vickers, J. (1995) “Competition and regulation in vertically related markets”, The 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 1–17, doi: 10.2307/2297839. 
Wei, H. (2003) “Market Competition, Performance and Industrial Concentration”, 
Economic Science Press, p. 231.
Yang, H. (2000) “Entry, Exit and Industrial Policy”, Shanghai People’s Publishing 
House, p. 248.
Jianbai Huang et al. • Industry regulation, competition, and the dynamics of productivity... 
324 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2015 • vol. 33 • sv. 2 • 299-324
Industrijski propisi, konkurencija i dinamika rasta proizvodnje na primjeru 
kineske industrije željeza i čelika1
Jianbai Huang2, Chuan Liu3, Daguo Lü4, Xiaoping Li5
Sažetak
Ova studija ima za cilj ispitati karakteristike učinkovitog razvoja kineske industrije 
željeza i čelika u okolnostima ograničene otvorenosti i regulacije, te raspraviti 
važne učinke regulatorne politike i ukupnih čimbenika produktivnosti (TFP) 
kineske industrije željeza i čelika. Primijenjena metoda je Cobb-Douglasova 
proizvodna funkcija u kombinaciji s polu-parametarskom metodom razgradnje 
produktivnosti. Ova studija,temeljena na mikrorazini skupa podataka o proizvodnji 
željeza i čelika baze podataka kineskih industrijskih poduzeća željeza i čelika u 
periodu između 1998. i 2007. godine, istražila je unutarnju povezanost 
korporativnog ulaza i izlaza, tržišnog natjecanja postojećih poduzeća i rasta 
ukupnih čimbenika produktivnosti (TFP) u industriji željeza i čelika. Rezultati 
istraživanja pokazuju da ulaz-izlaz potiče rast agregatne produktivnosti, dok niska 
učinkovitost raspodjele resursa značajno inhibira rast ukupnih čimbenika 
produktivnosti (TFP). Osnovni zaključak je da, uz znatnu intervenciju države u 
investicije poduzeća, tržišno natjecanje ne smije promovirati optimalnu 
učinkovitost raspodjele resursa u kineskoj industriji željeza i čelika, ali utječe na 
manju učinkovitost raspodjele resursa. 
Ključne riječi: dinamika produktivnosti, industrijski propisi, tržišno natjecanje, 
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